BREAKING: Declassified Documents Showed A Need For More Troops In 1999 And A Democratic Iraq "Not Feasible" (Updated and bumped)
(I am bumping this story back to the top as it is rather significant and now the mainstream media is starting to report on it. Just remember – you heard it here first lol) A new document has been unclassified through a FOIA request by the National Security Archive. A series of war games held […]
(I am bumping this story back to the top as it is rather significant and now the mainstream media is starting to report on it. Just remember – you heard it here first lol)
A new document has been unclassified through a FOIA request by the National Security Archive.
A series of war games held in 1999 specifically to anticipate problems following an invasion of Iraq assumed a deployment of 400,000 troops to maintain order, seal borders and provide for other security needs. But the games, known as Desert Crossing, were apparently ignored by the Defense Department. When CENTCOM commander Gen. Anthony Zinni, after his retirement, advised planners to refer back to Desert Crossing as they prepared for the 2003 invasion, the response reportedly was, “Never heard of it.”
Now, seven years later, documentation on preparations for the games and detailed After Action records have surfaced in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive, which is posting the materials on its Web site today.
This is very damaging to the administration and Pentagon. It also supports the claims by General Shinseki regarding the higher level of troops needed. Even more damming is the assessment of dealing with Iraq after the topple of Saddam:
The results of Desert Crossing, however, drew pessimistic conclusions regarding the immediate possible outcomes of such action. Some of these conclusions are interestingly similar to the events which actually occurred after Saddam was overthrown. (Note 1) The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to “rival forces bidding for power” which, in turn, could cause societal “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines” and antagonize “aggressive neighbors.” Further, the report illuminated worries that secure borders and a restoration of civil order may not be enough to stabilize Iraq if the replacement government were perceived as weak, subservient to outside powers, or out of touch with other regional governments. An exit strategy, the report said, would also be complicated by differing visions for a post-Saddam Iraq among those involved in the conflict.
The Desert Crossing report was similarly pessimistic when discussing the nature of a new Iraqi government. If the U.S. were to establish a transitional government, it would likely encounter difficulty, some groups discussed, from a “period of widespread bloodshed in which various factions seek to eliminate their enemies.” The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force. Moreover, the report suggested that the U.S. role be one in which it would assist Middle Eastern governments in creating the transitional government for Iraq.
In other words – an insurgency was highly predictable. Remember when Rumsfeld downplayed the prediction of an insurgency on Meet the Press last year? Well here you got top military leaders, who ran through a simulation of this in 1999 predicting exactly that, plus a wrath of secular violence.
The worse part is this:
The report stressed that the creation of a democratic government in Iraq was not feasible, but a new pluralistic Iraqi government which included nationalist leaders might be possible, suggesting that nationalist leaders were a stabilizing force.
How many times have we heard “a free and democratic Iraq” from Bush? The military and senior analysts knew this would not be feasible.
Just a little over a month ago, we heard this news:
Donald Rumsfeld’s Iraqi war plan worked beautifully for three weeks. U.S. troops quickly deposed Saddam Hussein and captured Baghdad with a relatively small force and with lightning speed.
But with Iraq on the verge of civil war three years later, the secretary of defense now admits that no one was well-prepared for what would happen after major combat ended.
“Well, I think that anyone who looks at it with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight has to say that there was not an anticipation that the level of insurgency would be anything approximating what it is,” Rumsfeld told CNN for the documentary, “CNN Presents Rumsfeld — Man of War,” which debuts Saturday at 8 p.m. ET.
No Mr. Rumsfeld – no one would have predicted it. No one except the military leadership during the Clinton administration.
Update #1:
The AP has picked up on this story now and are reporting on it. This should help get its way into the mainstream media and hopefully we will hear more about it on the cable news channels tomorrow.